over state or federal election processes. Still, Teachout's ACP, even one of limited scope, can teach us much. The Anti-Corruption Principle is a natural extension of prior scholarship tying our public law to contemporaneous eighteenth-century private law concepts and doctrinefiduciary duties, equity jurisprudence, trust law, and corporate law. In conclusion, the ACP provides fertile ground for new thinking and new research, but ultimately, it can teach us very little about election law or the scope of First Amendment protections in relation to the political process.
I.
WHY THIS COLLOQUY? The test of great scholarship is whether it changes the way people think and the way people live. That is also true for legal academic scholarship. But, for legal academics, perhaps the greatest sign of scholarly achievement is judicial reliance upon our craftsmanship. By any measure, Professor Teachout' Ct. 876, 948 n.51, 963-64 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 35 disapprovingly, by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. 3 If that were not enough of an accomplishment, The Anti-Corruption Principle has also been cited in practitioners' Supreme Court briefs, in other federal and state appellate and trial court briefs, and in more than thirty academic articles. 4 Finally, The Anti-Corruption Principle has entered the public discourse: George Will excoriated Teachout's article in his nationally syndicated column.
5
Now that is an achievement. Teachout's The Anti-Corruption Principle is part and parcel of the originalist project. 6 It is an attempt to understand the Constitution in light of its text, drafting records, ratification debates, and general late eighteenthcentury history. Specifically, Teachout makes three related and sequential historical and interpretive claims.
Step One. The Framers were "obsessed" 7 with corruption. In other words, preventing, or at least minimizing, corruption was among the Framers' primary goals. 8 Absent an appreciation of this purpose, one cannot understand either the Constitution's global architecture or several of its key structural provisions. REV. 1045 REV. (1994 . 7 Teachout, supra note 1, at 405 ("The Framers' obsession with, and understanding of, political corruption makes sense of constitutional phrases like 'of any kind whatever' in the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause . . . ." (emphasis added)); see also id. at 347, 348, 351 n.45, 352, 373, 393 n.245, 404, 406 (reiterating the Framers' or the Founders' obsession with political corruption). 8 See, e.g., id. at 347 ("[T] he fight against corruption is a central part of the United States Constitution-its historical origins, the language of the debates around it, its substance and its structure. It is not an overstatement to say that, above all else, the Framers of the Constitution saw the document as a structure to fight corruption." (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Teachout, supra note 2, at 165 ("At the time the Constitution was drafted, fighting corruption was at the core of the drafters' vision for the constitutive principles of the country."). 9 See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 1, at 359 ("Ultimately, three of the biggest protections [against corruption] created by the Framers were the Ineligibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause, and the Foreign Gifts Clause."). The Ineligibility Clause and the Emoluments Clause are the same clause. It appears that the third clause Teachout meant to list was the Incompatibility Clause.
Step Two. These separate individual anti-corruption constitutional provisions, working together, give rise to a freestanding structural anticorruption principle (ACP).
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Step Three. The ACP can compete against other constitutional provisions and doctrines, thereby providing originalist foundations for upholding congressional enactments that would otherwise be struck down under competing principles. The Foreign Emoluments Clause's inapplicability to these positions challenges Teachout's "obsession" claim.
C. Teachout's Federal Impeachment and Disqualification Problem
Similarly, a corrupt (elected or appointed) federal official who is impeached by the House and tried, convicted, and disqualified by the Senate remains free to take any state office, and according to the academic consensus also remains free to hold a seat in Congress. 28 In other words, if the Framers believed that corruption posed the chief danger to the new Republic, one wonders why corrupt Senate-convicted and disqualified former federal officials were still eligible to hold state offices-offices which could indirectly affect significant operations of the new national government-and were also (arguably) eligible to hold congressional seats, thereby injecting corrupt officials directly into national policymaking. This too seems to challenge Teachout's "obsession" claim.
D. Teachout's Foreign Law Problem
Likewise, the Foreign Emoluments Clause proscribes a holder of an Office . . . under [the United States] from "accepting" a foreign government's gift or title of nobility. That restriction would not apply either to a person who accepts a foreign government's gift or title prior-even, perhaps, just prior-to becoming a federal officer, or to a person who accepts a foreign government's gift or title after leaving federal office. Likewise, that restriction would not apply to an active federal officer who receives a foreign government's gift or title by operation of foreign lawe.g., inheritance-absent any voluntary or individualized act of "acceptance."
29
If the world of the Framers was corruption obsessed, as argued by Teachout, then why does the Framers' Foreign Emoluments Clause not direct federal officers receiving foreign offices or titles via inheritance to actively reject such benefits (or that failure to do so will result in the loss of domestic office)?
Again, if the Framers had been "obsessed" with corruption, it is difficult to understand why state offices (and thereby state election processes) and all of these federal positions and possibilities (e.g., 28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House Impeachment Clause); id. § 3, cl. beyond the scope of Teachout's ACP. Where election funds are raised and spent independently of candidates (including incumbent candidates), where such monies do not flow through candidates' hands (or their agents' hands), and where the candidates do not direct how the money is spent, the monies will be spent without any meaningful or substantive "acceptance" by the candidates.
It would seem to follow that in regard to all federal and state elected positions (i.e., the President, Vice President, federal electors, members of Congress, and all elected state posts), the Foreign Emoluments Clause cannot provide a textual basis (even if "translated" into modern circumstances) for regulating independent campaign contributions and expenditures. The contrary view would seem to denude "accept" of any substantial meaning. In short, if Teachout is to argue that independent expenditures may be validly regulated by federal statute under the aegis of her freestanding anti-corruption principle, then she must do so without relying on the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
F. Teachout's Original Intent Problem(s)
The logic of Teachout's original intent-based argument would expand the scope of the ACP based on the Framers' general views or corruptionspeak as expressed in their debates at the Federal Convention and in the state ratifying conventions. But the plain text of the Foreign Emoluments Clause-i.e., the Constitution's original public meaning-blocks going down that road. The Foreign Emoluments Clause has no application absent: (i) an acceptance of a present, title, etc. by (ii) Likewise, efforts to promote or to stop proposals to amend the Constitution-among both the public and elected officials-would seem to lack incumbents capable of "accepting" any benefit. See generally U.S. CONST. art. V (discussing formal procedural requirements for amending the Constitution).
Indeed, Teachout's The Anti-Corruption Principle might supply the textbook example of the danger of the original intent approach to constitutional interpretation. The democratically enacted public text of the Constitution recedes, only to be replaced by amorphous normative principles whose contours are "discovered" in documents that were not widely-or even publicly-available during the ratification process. If those normative principles have deep support in the present day, they might have some strong claim on the modern interpreter. But a generalized fear that the other is corrupt or disloyal seems an odd and, perhaps, a dangerous place to begin our long march back to the lost world of 1787.
No doubt America has had and continues to have enemies abroad and traitors at home. Benedict Arnold was real. But America's history also illustrates that some fears and claims involving divided loyalties have been, at times, exaggerated and misused. We might contemplate carefully before treading down this road; it might lead to places we had best avoid. Hamilton was instructed to include "every person holding any civil office or employment under the United States, (except the judges[])." Every, not some; any, not some.
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The Senate's use of "except the judges" provided no excuse to fail to list anyone other than judges from his reply. His reply matched the language of the Senate order: listing "civil offices or employments under the [U]nited States (except the Judges)."
What did Hamilton do? His reply to the Senate was roughly ninety handwritten manuscript pages, and it did not include the salaries or disbursements made to senators or representatives. Likewise, Hamilton's reply did not include line entries for the President and Vice President. On the other hand, Hamilton's reply did include line entries for the salary and expenses of the Secretary of the Senate and his staff, and for the salary and expenses of the Clerk of the House and his staff.
Simply put, Hamilton's reply included all appointed officers from each of the three branches of the federal government, but no elected officials from any branch. Again, if Hamilton was correct, if he correctly identified the scope of Office . . . under the United States, and usage here was uniform and followed the Constitution's usage, then Teachout's ACP cannot reach any federal elected officials. President Washington replied the same day. He wrote:
B. George Washington's French Gifts
Philadelphia, Decr 22nd 1791.
Dear Sir, I accept, with great pleasure, the new and elegant print of the King of the French, which you have been so obliging as to send to me this morning as a mark of your attachment to my person. You will believe me, Sir, when I assure you, that I have a grateful and lively sense of the personal respect and friendship expressed in your favor which accompanied the Print, and that I am, with sentiments of sincere esteem and regard, Dear Sir, your most obedt Servt Go: Washington.
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Washington accepted the ambassador's gift (the print and its frame), he kept the gift, and he never asked for congressional consent to accept or to keep the gift. This gift was not one of de minimis value, 48 nor was it a gift from a close personal friend or relative of Washington's. This is no mere invitation to engage in a tangential discussion about Akhil and Vikram Amar's scholarship. 54 Teachout's The Anti-Corruption Principle invites us to rewrite First Amendment jurisprudence, but it is also an implicit (or, perhaps, an inadvertent) invitation to rewrite the academic consensus regarding the Constitution's usage in regard to office and officer. Thus, The Anti-Corruption Principle has profound implications for many constitutional provisions, not just the First Amendment. Before we go down 54 Admittedly, such a conversation might be difficult, as it appears to me that Akhil Amar's writings on this subject are not entirely internally consistent. See Amar, supra note 27, at 1061 n.67 (asserting that it is "not implausible" to view Article V delegates to a national convention as "officers of the United States"). I see no reasonable way to characterize delegates to an Article V national convention as Judicial Branch or Executive Branch officers. At first blush, their function would appear entirely legislative. However, according to the Amarian framework, the Constitution's officer terminology does not reach the Legislative Branch. So why should the meaning of officers of the United States reach members of a convention with a purely legislative function? Again, since 1995, Akhil Amar has argued in academic fora that statutory legislative officer succession is plainly unconstitutional. See Amar & Amar, supra note 28, passim. But, in congressional testimony, he took a different position. See Presidential Succession Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 52 (2004) (statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School) ("And I do think in very, very highly unusual situations where you really try to have Cabinet succession, officer succession, and everyone's gone, I think only a real constitutional zealot, maybe without good judgment, would say you can't have congressional leaders in that circumstance because the Constitution really isn't a suicide pact, and so I think I appreciate sort of the prudence involved there." (emphasis added)). So in precisely what circumstances does the Constitution's use of Office embrace legislative officers? Finally, the Presidential Succession Clause uses the language of Officer. Akhil Amar has described former officers as nonofficers, i.e., private citizens. As such, he has argued that a Speaker or Senate President pro tempore cannot resign his legislative position after succeeding to the presidency. In other words, only current officers are eligible to succeed under the Succession Clause, and if an officer resigns his legislative position after succeeding to the presidency, he loses the ability to retain the presidency. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 171; Amar & Amar, supra note 28, at 120. However, the Impeachment Clause also uses the language of office, and Professor Amar has suggested that former officers may be impeached. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 568 n.53; Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 214 n.36 (1996) . What accounts for these many strange inconsistencies relating to the language of office and officer? that road, Teachout should explain to us exactly what the stakes are and where her new (or purportedly "old" Framer-centric) view will take us. For this reason, it would be desirable, not only for Teachout to respond to my critique, but for other commentators who have taken a position on this issue to do so.
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One last point must be made. I do not think the ACP can reach elected positions-state or federal-and, as such, it cannot inform our views of election law or the First Amendment. However, I do agree that Teachout's broad conceptual framework is sound. There is a structural anti-corruption principle of constitutional dimension. That principle, the ACP, vindicates substantial congressional control over statutory officers, i.e., officers under the United States. It puts federal statutory officers in a fiduciary relationship under the government, in respect to the officers' elected masters and all of the nation's citizens. In this sense, Teachout's paper is a natural extension of prior scholarship tying our public law to contemporaneous eighteenthcentury private law concepts and doctrine-fiduciary duties, equity jurisprudence, trust law, and corporate law. 56 For example, Teachout points out that the concept of corruption embraced two related subconcepts: "dependency" relationships 57 and "selfserving" activity, i.e., "us[ing] . . . public power for private ends." 58 Teachout is entirely correct about this. The domination/dependence theme is the subject matter of the Incompatibility Clause, and the bias/selfdealing/self-serving theme is the subject matter of the Ineligibility Clause. It is precisely because these two clauses attack two different, albeit related, 55 Other (living) commentators who have embraced this position, i.e., that all office-related structural problems that the Framers chose different office-laden language within each of these two provisions. The Incompatibility Clause makes use of Office under the United States language, and the Ineligibility Clause makes use of Office under the Authority of the United States language. Different language accomplishes different purposes, just as one might suspect from reasonable and accomplished draftspersons.
Indeed, the distinction between domination by third parties and bias in connection with self-interest still plays an active role in corporate law. A court, applying traditional principles of equity, will review a decision of a board of directors for an alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 59 on a showing that a majority of those voting in support of a contested transaction were either: (i) dominated (lacked independence), or (ii) biased (in the self-serving sense). 60 I suspect that Teachout's ACP can teach us very little about election law or the First Amendment, but The Anti-Corruption Principle significantly adds to our understanding of the private law genealogy of our Constitution's linguistic heritage. 61 That might not be what Teachout hoped to achieve, or what Justice Stevens intended in Citizens United, but it is a considerable intellectual accomplishment nonetheless.
